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The Economics of Commercial Real Estate Preleasing 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Preleasing of to-be-built commercial real estate space is a pervasive worldwide practice. 
Although such preleasing is an extensive and significant activity, it has not received much 
attention in the real estate economics and finance literature. Using an equilibrium micro-
economic agency model, this paper examines the economics of preleasing for to-be-built 
commercial real estate. The equilibrium prelease contract rent is a function of several variables, 
including the expected spot market rent, financing benefits from preleasing, developer-lessor and 
tenant-lessee risk-hedging behavior, the interplay between lessor and lessee default options, and 
the market capitalization rate. Our paper demonstrates how the distribution of risk preferences 
for lessees (and lessors) generates separating market equilibrium for the prelease and spot lease. 
We also consider the impacts of developer default and the lessee cancellation clause on the 
prelease rent equilibrium. 
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1. Introduction 
Commercial real estate preleasing, transacted via a lease contract between lessee (tenant) 
and landlord (lessor) that specifies a future rent for a future date when lessee occupancy will 
commence, is a common international practice that is often utilized for to-be-constructed 
commercial real estate.
 2
 Essentially a forward lease contract, preleasing provides benefits for the 
lessor and the lessee. It is frequently required by lenders and investors to ensure that a building 
will retain collateral market value in the event of builder default. Preleasing contracts are used 
for all types of commercial real estate, including office, industrial, and retail space. 3 Although 
preleasing is an important and integral activity in the world of real estate, it has received 
relatively little attention in the academic literature. Our study is one of the first attempts we 
know of to address the theoretical determinants of economic equilibrium for the preleasing 
marketplace.  
Preleasing arrangements for to-be-built real estate involve tradeoffs for lessees, lessor-
developers, and third-party capital sources (including construction and permanent lenders). By 
preleasing, the lessee satisfies its future space use requirements but also gains both an option and 
a hedge. Depending on the terms of the prelease agreement, the lessee may choose to default on 
occupancy if market rents in the future decline significantly, but the pre-lease simultaneously 
protects the lessee against upside market rental increases. On the other hand, the preleasing 
lessee faces a risk of non-performance by the lessor-developer (i.e., failure to deliver the building 
in a timely fashion). By arranging for future tenancy before the completion of the building, the 
developer creates a guaranteed level of cash flow for the real estate project. Abstracting from 
lessee default, the prelease contract  would in principle be risk-reducing for the developer and the 
lender and provide the developer with access to capital on terms and conditions that either would 
not be otherwise available or would be more costly. Lenders frequently require some level of 
preleasing for properties before they are willing to deliver loan proceeds. Prelease conditions 
may be specified in loan covenants; If prelease requirements are not satisfied in a timely fashion, 
the lender may seek such remedies as requiring the loan to be re-margined, vacating the loan in 
favor of a stand-by take-out, or rescinding the loan offer. 
                                                 
2
 Our paper focuses on preleasing for to-be-built (new) commercial real estate projects. The analysis is applicable, 
with relatively simple modifications, to other commercial preleasing arrangements for existing properties as well as 
lease renewal options. 
3
 Although they are popular in retail development, prelease contracts for anchor tenants such as department stores 
frequently contain significant rent discounts because (1) the anchors bring positive externality to the shopping center 
and (2) anchor tenants simplify and enhance the renting of space to other tenants.  
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In summary, for the lessee, preleasing can reduce search risks and costs, provide a lessee 
with a default option, and hedge against unanticipated future market rent increases. From the 
landlord-investor’s point of view, preleasing reduces cash flow risk. Finally, the debt lender will 
use preleasing conditions to reduce the risks of lending. Of course, the various risks of default 
complicate preleasing for all three parties. In particular, the lessee may not be able or willing to 
take occupancy. On the other hand, the developer may be unable to perform, causing lessee 
occupancy disruption as well as adversely affecting the lender’s position. 
In the next section of the paper, we provide a selective review of the related literature. In 
subsequent sections, we develop a theoretical framework for economic equilibrium that we apply 
towards understanding the economic incentives and mechanisms for lessees, owner-developer-
investors, and lenders to optimize economic utility through preleasing. We examine how the 
interlinked preleasing options for lessees and lessor-developers affect commercial real estate 
market outcomes. Our model provides insights into the conditions that generate a separating 
equilibrium for the existence of preleasing and “spot” leasing.  
 
2. Research Context: Selected Literature 
The finance and real estate literature on real asset leasing is extensive. In finance, the vast 
majority of leasing research focuses on the role of taxation in determining the choice between 
leasing and owning real assets. Virtually any standard finance and investment textbook analyzes 
the lease-own decision using a discounted cash flow model as well as an attendant analysis 
relating to the complex options associated with real asset user choices. Redman and Tanner 
(2001), using corporate real estate executive surveys, provide information about the real estate 
leasing versus ownership decision-making process. In their analysis, they identify various 
motives and techniques for leasing and ownership of real estate assets. 
The real estate finance and economics literature offers a relatively large set of empirical 
studies that emphasize the determinants of rental rates for commercial real estate as well as those 
involved in the adjustment process for rental rates and vacancy. In general, the joint adjustment 
between rents and vacancy are found to be functions of the macro-economic environment, the 
local employment market, and the commercial real estate supply, including new development. 
The classic article by Wheaton, Torto, and Evans (1997) is an excellent source for exploring the 
relationship between rents, vacancy rates, and the interplay of local employment rates. 
Sivatanidou (2002), among many others, stresses the importance of taking into account spatial 
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variation in supply and demand and other idiosyncratic market characteristics for specifying the 
rental market. Her analysis focuses on the adjustment towards equilibrium, which in many 
markets may be gradual, suggesting that prevailing rents may deviate from implicit long-run 
equilibrium levels for substantial periods of time. She concludes that ignoring the sluggish rental 
adjustment process may produce misleading inferences about the determinants of long-run 
equilibrium values for rents and vacancy rates. These empirical econometric analyses usually 
evaluate the rental-vacancy adjustment process at the MSA level, and are macro in nature; and 
do not explicitly focus upon the details of the lessee-lessor rental process. 
A small but burgeoning literature emphasizing the micro-organization of real estate 
markets has emerged for explaining the linkages between the lessor and the lessee for 
determining lease rates and market values. Papers in this stream of the literature are more closely 
related to our research. Wong, Chau, and Yiu (2007) focus on the interrelationship between the 
real estate spot and forward markets for residential sales for the Hong Kong housing market. 
They find that the forward and spot markets are interrelated, as would be expected, with 
economic shocks in the forward market being transmitted to the spot market. Fan, Pu and Ong 
(2012), Edelstain, Liu and Wu (2012) and Chan, Wang and Yang (2012) are among the recent 
studies that focus on the theoretical underpinning of the presale market. Mooradian and Yang 
(2002) devise a theoretical commercial real estate model with asymmetric information between 
tenants and landlords. In their analysis, depending upon the nature of the asymmetric information, 
the tenant and landlord negotiate gross versus net leases. 
The three papers that are most similar to ours include two by Grenadier (1995, 2005) and 
one by Buttimer and Ott (2007). Grenadier (1995), using a real option approach, models 
commercial development with stochastic lease rates and occupancy. In his model, the 
commercial property owner leases vacant space at a rental rate that is determined by a stochastic 
downward-sloping lessee demand curve. Tenants are always available, but because of the 
downward-sloping demand, lessors may not choose to offer vacant units. The demand lease rate 
is stochastic, and there is a lease rate that will trigger a change in vacancy for individual 
buildings. Lease rates also determine individual property development decisions, but only upon 
completion of the building will the owners rent the optimal amount of space based on demand. 
Grenadier (2005) modifies his earlier analysis to include, among other things, the possibility of 
preleasing. The Grenadier models are driven primarily by the aforementioned assumption of the 
downward-sloping stochastic lease demand faced by the individual property developer-lessor. 
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Buttimer and Ott (2007) develop a leasing occupancy commercial real estate model that 
is in many ways similar to that of Grenadier, but it differs insofar as the model assumes that the 
market is competitive and lessors are price takers. Uncertain lessee demand enters the model 
through a search framework, whereby frequency of tenant arrivals and ability to pay are key 
mechanisms for clearing the market. Depending on the exact nature of tenant arrivals and the 
distribution of the ability to pay rent, Buttimer and Ott permit preleasing to occur, and the 
developer may thereby hedge the risks of leasing rental rates and vacancies. 
Micro-leasing market papers generally utilize a real options approach to determine 
leasing market implications. The underlying workings of the economic actors are implicit, 
essentially taking the form of a black box. In the Grenadier models, the downward-sloping 
stochastic demand curve is the key to the developer decision-making process. In the Buttimer 
and Ott analysis, however, the price-taking nature of the developer is the crucial assumption. In 
this paper, we work with a utility-maximization economic model in which the developer and 
tenants determine an equilibrium between the preleasing and spot leasing market. The choices 
between leasing in the spot market and preleasing are determined by the interaction of the 
preferences of the tenants and developers. By using our micro-economic lessor and lessee 
framework, we can derive an explicit equilibrium for preleasing activity and lease rates as well 
as the conditions for generating a well-defined separating equilibrium. 
 
3. The Model Setup and Principles for Equilibrium Pricing 
In our model, the commercial real estate developer faces rent uncertainty for to-be-built 
space. The model has one period with two dates: a prelease date, t = 0, and the completion date, t 
= 1. We assume that the commercial real estate lease rate (rent per square foot) at t=1 follows a 
normal distribution:  
1L    ,      (1) 
where  is the expected rent,  is a random variable unknown to lessees and is normally 
distributed with mean equal to zero and volatility of σ. 
There are two types of economic agents: a semi-monopoly developer (lessor) and many 
lessees (tenants) who require space for business operations.
4
 We assume that the lessees and the 
                                                 
4
 For expositional convenience, we assume a monopolistic developer. 
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developer-lessor are risk-averse with Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) 
 
utility
 
.
5
 (A 
risk-neutral lessee and a risk-neutral lessor-developer are special cases that are discussed in 
section 4.1.)  
Endowed with a permit to develop a commercial real estate property, the developer 
commences building at t = 0 and completes construction for occupancy at t = 1.
6
 The developer 
finances the project with a standard construction loan, which in this instance requires that a 
portion of the to-be-built space be preleased before the construction is completed. The remaining 
space in the building will be leased at t=1 at the prevailing spot market rent, which is determined, 
in turn, by the supply of and demand for space on the lease spot markets.
7
 The developer is the 
lessor during the construction period. Figure 1 outlines the timeline for both the lessor-developer 
and the lessees. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Timeline in the Economy 
 
3.1 The Lessees 
Tenants are naturally heterogeneous along a number of dimensions, such as business 
operation, market power, and amount of space needed. For analytical tractability, we assume that 
the tenant characteristics are summarized in the risk-aversion parameter. Following Dumas 
(1989), Wang (1996), and Chan and Kogan (2002), we model the heterogeneity of the lessee’s 
risk aversion explicitly: There exists a continuum of tenants       , with CARA utility 
indexed for lessee i using i . Each lessee minimizes the loss of expected utility caused by rental 
expenditures by either prelease (j = 0) or spot lease (j = 1) contracts. 
               1
0,1
 ( ) exp    0,1
i
i
j i j
j
Min EU L E L j 

   
            (2) 
 
                                                 
5
 Although CARA utility does not contain a wealth effect, the main insights for our analyses do not depend on the 
choice of the particular utility function. Another form of utility function frequently used is Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion (CRRA), which engenders similar results.  
6
 The scale of the development is pre-determined.  
7
 The spot market rent is treated as an effective rent that takes vacancy into consideration.  
Date:      T = 0     T = 1 
Lessees:      Some lessees enter the prelease market     Other lessees enter the spot market 
Lessor-Developer:   Commence construction        Complete construction 
      Offer Prelease and obtain financing       Offer spot lease and repay the loan 
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3.2 The Lessor-developer 
As a local monopoly, the developer can determine the prelease rents for the new 
development project. However, upon completion of her development, the spot rent will be 
determined by the local space market. The total number of units to be developed is assumed to be 
nonrandom in this economy.
8
 Assuming for convenience that the developer finances the project 
with a construction loan maturing at T = 1, the total investment cost is I and the loan amount is 
M. The interest rates are r1, and r2 for prelease and spot lease projects, respectively. Because 
preleases secure future cash flows, the developer obtains more favorable financing terms with a 
lower interest rate for the project by preleasing some space (i.e., where r1≤ r2). 
Upon completion, the developer either sells the building to an investor or becomes the 
owner-lessor.
9
 The developer’s net profit (X) equals the capitalized rents less the total costs of 
development, which are computed as a periodic lease rate (
jL ) divided by a market capitalization 
rate (Cap), minus the total costs of investment (I) and the financing cost (
jr M )). 
     0,1jj j
L
X I r M j
Cap
           (3) 
Assume that the developer maximizes the utility of profit at the building completion date. 
If the developer’s utility function is CARA (X) with risk-aversion parameter (g), the developer’s 
expected utility of profits from an average lessee can be expressed as the weighted average of 
expected utilities of profits from prelease contracts and spot market lease contracts: 
           
*
0
1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0, exp expg g
L
Max EU L L gX L D L E gX L D L            (4) 
where D0(L0), and D1(L0) represent the market demand for preleases and spot leases, respectively. 
 
3.3 The Basic Principles for Equilibrium Pricing 
The market equilibrium will produce two important results: 1) the market-clearing rent 
for the prelease contract and 2) the scale of prelease demand. 
                                                 
8
 If the quantities of production are allowed to vary, along with the scale of forward hedging, the results remain 
unchanged. As established by Feder, Just, and Schmitz 1980, in the presence of the forward market a complete 
separation is maintained between the production decision and the hedging (forward-selling) decision. Chan, Fang, 
and Yang 2008, and Edelstein, Liu, and Wu (2011) also find that pre-committed sales do not affect a developer’s 
production decision. 
9
 A commercial lease usually contains a non-disturbance clause, which requires that lessees remain in the building 
and pay the same rents under the circumstances of transaction or foreclosure. 
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The strategy for solving this equilibrium model involves jointly maximizing the utilities 
for lessees and developers. We assume there exists an optimal prelease rent and then calibrate the 
equilibrium market-clearing rent that maximizes the developer utility functions. In the first step, 
we solve the lessee’s maximization problem assuming the spot rent and the prelease rent are 
given. Since there is a continuum of heterogeneous lessees, the marginal lessee, who is 
indifferent between renting the space on the spot market or the prelease market, and determines 
rental market equilibrium. The critical level of risk-aversion, γ*, is a function of the optimal rent 
for preleases, and divides to-be-developed commercial space into two tiers: the prelease market 
(D0) and the spot market (D1). Specifically, if a given lessee is more risk-adverse than the 
marginal lessee is, she will choose to rent the space via the prelease market, and vice versa. 
Therefore, the lessee’s renting decision rule can be summarized as: 
A. Rent the space on the prelease market if *   i  or 0[ ( )]FE U L < 1[ ( )]SE U L ; 
B. Rent the space on the spot market if *  < i  or 0[ ( )]FE U L > 1[ ( )]SE U L ; 
C. Be indifferent between the prelease or spot market lease if *  = i  or 0 1[ ( )] [ ( )]F SE U L E U L  . 
We further assume that the distribution of lessee risk aversion is exponential,
10
 with a 
mean risk aversion of 1/λ. 
 for  0
( , )  
0        for  0
e
f
 
 

 
 

        (5) 
 
Figure 2 displays the demand scale for prelease and spot real estate transactions. The 
market demand for a prelease contract is
-e . That is, the proportion of -
0D e
  lessees will 
choose renting via a prelease contract at T=0. Similarly, the proportion of spot market 
commercial space will be 1 1D e
   . 
 
In the second step, we endogenously derive an equilibrium for the market rent for 
preleases. The developer decides at T = 0 what portion of the space is to be preleased and how 
                                                 
10 Explicitly introducing lessee risk heterogeneity makes the scale of market equilibrium demand for prelease 
contracts endogenous.  
 10 
 
much is to be charged for the prelease. The equilibrium rent for the prelease is determined by 
maximizing the expected utility of profit from the prelease and spot lease. The developer’s 
control variable is the rental rate that the lessor charges for the preleases. With the scale of 
demand for the prelease and spot markets solved in the first step, the developer’s maximization 
problem determines the “market price” for prelease contracts. As the market scale is a function 
of the prelease rent, the monopoly developer trades off between the income from each lease and 
the number of lessees the developer attracts for the prelease and spot markets. 
 
4. The Basic Model without Lessor Default or a Lessee Cancellation Clause 
As a benchmark scenario, we assume the lessor and the lessees will fulfill the lease 
contract. That is, the lessees will not terminate the preleases, and the developer will complete the 
project and deliver space on time for the tenants. To gain a graduated understanding of the 
impact of default on prelease behavior, we consider developer default in section 5 and tenant 
cancellation in section 6. 
 Let  0
i
FU L  and  1
i
SU L  be tenant i’s (dis)utility functions derived from rental 
expenditure for the prelease and spot lease, respectively. 
       0 01E ( ) exp
i
F i
i
U L L

                                  (6)   
       2 211 11 1 2[ ( )] exp expi i
i
S i i iE U L E L                       (7) 
The “marginal lessee,” * , is indifferent between renting space on the spot or prelease 
markets; she would derive the same utility from either the prelease transaction or the spot market 
lease. Equating equations (6) and (7) yields the following: 
 
*
0
0 2
2( )L
L



           (8) 
 The critical value of a lessee’s risk aversion is an increasing function of the prelease rent, 
as shown in equation (9). This equation implies that the demand share from lessee preleases, D0, 
is decreasing when the equilibrium prelease rent increases. Equation (8) further indicates that the 
demand-rent sensitivity is an inverse function of rental market risk (i.e., rent volatility). 
*
2
0
2
 
L





        (9) 
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The lessor-developer’s combined expected utility of profits from the prelease and spot lease 
markets will be: 
 
*
0
0 11 1
0 1
exp ( ) exp( *) exp ( ) 1 exp( *)g g
L
gL gL
Max EU g I r M E g I r M
Cap Cap
            
    
    
    
   
(10) 
 The first-order condition for the developer’s optimal leasing strategy is  
* 2 2 *
*0
0 12
0 0
exp exp ( ) 0
2
gL g g g
gr M gr M
Cap L Cap Cap Cap L
   
  
      
             
     
         (11) 
Using equations (8) and (9) yields the equilibrium prelease rent for the developer in the 
following equation: 
   
2 2
*
0 1 0log(1 ) where 
2 2
g Cap g
L Cap r M r r r
Cap g Cap
 


                (12) 
From equation (12), the market equilibrium rent for one unit of commercial space in the 
prelease market,
0L , is jointly determined by: 
(1) Expected market average rent . 
*
0L  is a positive linear function of . Higher average market rents induce higher prelease 
rents. 
(2) Financing benefit from preleases r M  . 
Since the developer is assumed to be able to obtain a lower interest rate for construction 
financing for preleased space, she is willing to provide a rent discount to lessees who sign 
preleases. Larger financing benefits, r M  , create lower prelease rents. 
(3) Developer-lessor risk-hedging discount
2
2
g
Cap

. 
If the developer-lessor is risk-averse, she is willing to hedge future rental market risk by 
providing a rent discount to lessees who choose to sign prelease contracts. Higher levels 
of developer risk aversion (g) and greater levels of market risk (
2 ) generate lower 
prelease rents. 
(4) Lessee risk-hedging premium  
2
2
log 1
Cap g
g Cap


 . 
If lessees are more risk-averse on average than the lessors are, they will wish to secure 
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space in the newly-developed building by signing preleases. Higher average lessee risk 
aversion ( 1

) or larger market rental risk (
2 ) will raise the prelease rental rate. 
Other factors that influence the market equilibrium preleasing rents include but not limit to 
the following:  
(5) The capitalization rate (Cap). 
The market capitalization rate transforms the value of risk hedging and financing benefit 
into cash flows (rents). Because the Cap influences three terms in equation (12), the 
impact of the cap rate on the equilibrium prelease rent is non-monotonic and ambiguous. 
(6) Macro-economic factors. 
Other macro-economic factors also play important roles in determining the equilibrium 
rents. In our model, those factors reflect overall economic conditions and influence the 
preleasing activities through the channel of interest rate (r), expected market rental 
growth (Δμ), and rental volatility (σ).  
 
The market share for prelease demand is  
2
2
2
0 2
2
1 exp
2
Cap
gg g Cap rM
D
Cap Cap

  
 

   
     
  
      (13) 
 
4.1 The Special Cases of Risk-Neutral Lessees and a Risk-Neutral Lessor 
In our model to this point, we have assumed that the lessees and the lessor are risk-averse. 
The optimal prelease rent, determined by equation (12), depends on the distribution of risk 
aversion among the lessees and the lessor, among other factors. What if at least one of the 
contracting counterparties is risk-neutral? What if both are? We now discuss scenarios involving 
risk-neutral agents as special cases. 
Risk-neutral lessees: Taking the limit with the average risk-aversion parameter to 
infinity, equation (12) will determine the optimal prelease rent with a risk-neutral lessee: 
    
2
*
0
2
g
L Cap r M
Cap

                   (14) 
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Since the developer is concerned about the future vacancy, she will offer preleasing discounts to 
risk-neutral tenants in order to secure future cash flows. In this case, all lessees will prelease, that 
is D0=1. 
Risk-neutral lessor: Taking the limit in equation (12) with the developer risk-aversion 
parameter g tending to zero creates the optimal prelease rent in equation (15): 
     
2
*
0
2
L Cap r M



                      (15) 
The equilibrium prelease rent for the risk-neutral lessor is greater than the rent would be 
if the lessor were risk-averse, because the lessor risk-hedging discount vanishes (compare 
equation (12) with equation (15)). Under this scenario, the lessees would be willing to pay a 
premium to hedge against any future real estate rental-rate risk. The market demand for preleases 
is reduced to D0=exp(2λCapΔrM/σ
2
-1). 
Risk-neutral lessees and risk-neutral lessor: Combining risk-neutral lessees with the 
risk-neutral lessor yields the following optimal prelease rent: 
    *
0L Cap r M                       (16) 
The equilibrium prelease rent when both lessees and the lessor-developer are risk-neutral 
contains only two components. Without hedging demand, the value of prelease cash flow is 
equal to the capitalized future expected rents minus the financing benefit the developer enjoys 
through the use of preleases. Again in this case, all lessees will prelease the commercial space, 
that is D0=1. 
 
4.2 The equilibrium prelease rent and market risk 
The equilibrium lease-risk function for the commercial real estate prelease rent varies 
with levels of risk aversion associated with lessees and the developer-lessor. To understand the 
rent-risk relationship in the prelease market, we simulate the rental market dynamics with the 
base rent of $10 per s.f. and cap rate of 10% (unless otherwise specified). The three panels in 
Figure 3 highlight three comparative statics analyses. As shown in Figure 3-A, when rental 
market risk increases, the prelease rent varies directly with the relationship of the lessees’ risk 
aversion to that of the developer. The prerelease rent is greater than the expected future spot rent 
if the average lessee’s risk aversion is greater than that of the lessor-developer. The above pattern 
is not surprising, because the prelease rent will reflect the fact that risk-adverse lessees are 
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typically willing to “insure” against the future rental risk. The converse is true if the lessor is 
more risk-averse and willing to hedge her risk by providing a prelease discount. 
As shown in equation (12), the equilibrium prelease rent is a non-monotonic function of 
commercial leasing risk
2 . When lessees are more risk-averse than the developer-lessor 
typically is, i.e., 1  g  , the optimal prelease price 
*
0L is a concave function of rental risk
2 . 
The maximum optimal prelease rental rate is achieved when the volatility of the real estate 
leasing rates satisfies the condition in equation (17): 
*2
2
2 ( )Cap Cap g
g




       (17)
 
The corresponding prelease rental rate is generated by equation (18): 
 *0,max log( ) 1Cap Capg gL r M       
      (18) 
The market capitalization rate plays an important role in equilibrium prelease pricing by 
linking real estate space market equilibrium cash flow to the real estate asset market valuation. 
As shown in Figure 3-B, which assumes that the lessor and the lessees have equivalent levels of 
risk aversion, the equilibrium prelease rent increases monotonically with the cap rate, because 
higher cap rates translate into lower market asset values. The wedge of prelease rents between 
the high cap rate and the low cap rate is larger when rental market risk is larger, because the 
lessor-developer needs to set a higher risk premium for the prelease rent to compensate for 
increased risk. 
Assuming the lessor and the lessees have equivalent levels of risk aversion, the financing 
benefit from the preleases include a lower interest rate, higher loan-to-value ratios (thus a larger 
loan amount), or both. As shown in Figure 3-C, and as would be expected, the greater the 
financing benefit, the lower the equilibrium prelease rent. 
[Insert figure 3 around here] 
 
5. Effects of Developer-Lessor Default 
The base case analysis highlights the impact of risk-hedging behavior on the part of the 
lessees and the lessor-developer, and the financing benefits created by prelease contracts. In 
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reality, the developer may not be able to deliver the preleased premises on time. Developer 
default can occur because of insufficient construction capital, (a common occurrence during the 
recent credit crisis recession of 2008-2009), unexpected increases in construction costs, harsh 
weather or other catastrophic natural events, or other unforeseen circumstances that dramatically 
change the market environment. As discussed earlier that the preleasing affects project financing, 
which in turn determines the feasibility of a project. Developer may choose to default if 
preleasing was not successful. We, however, do not consider the developer default from this 
reason in our model, because a monopoly developer can always obtain a certain tenants on the 
prelease contract by reducing prelease rents.
11
 Moreover the preleasing market is likely to break 
down due to moral hazard issues, if the lessees know that the landlord will strategically default.  
Of course, developer default may have significant impacts on preleased tenancy to the 
extent that it interrupts the planned move-in and business operation at the new site. In some 
circumstances, the lessees will be forced to search for alternative space on the spot leasing 
market at the planned move-in date. The lessee’s inconvenience and costs caused by a possible 
lessor default should be incorporated into the equilibrium prelease rent contract. In this section, 
we explicitly consider developer-lessor default. 
We assume that the developer’s failure to deliver the real estate space at the planned 
move-in date, T = 1, is exogenous. Let the default probability of the monopoly developer be p. 
The financial loss incurred by the lessee due to developer default is assumed to be a linear 
portion of the prelease rent, L0.
12
 
For a prelease lessee, the total rental expenditures will be L0+L1 if the developer 
defaults, and L0 if the developer does not default. Therefore, the prelease lessee i’s utility 
function is modified to form equation (19):  
          
1
0 0 1exp 1FEU E p L p L L                 (19) 
Equating the expected utility of a prelease contract, equation (19), with the expected 
utility of the spot market lease, equation (7), we derive the critical level for lessee risk aversion 
for market equilibrium with exogenous developer default: 
                                                 
11
 Assuming that the developer or the local real estate development authority has done a thorough feasibility analysis 
before the development permit was issued, we should not expect a sudden shift in space market demand.  
12
 For expositional simplicity, we assume that lessee transaction and search costs caused by the lessor default are nil 
and that there are no litigation actions. 
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 
 
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*
0 0* *
2
2 1 1
  >  where 
1
L kL p
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p
 
 

   
 

       (20) 
The optimal prelease rent can be solved by maximizing the developer’s utility of profits.  
   
 
2 2
*
0
1 0
log(1 )
2 2
1 1
where   
1
g Cap g
L Cap r M
Cap g kCap
p
r r r and k
p
 



      
 
   

       (21) 
When there is no default risk (p=0) or there is no measurable financial loss caused by the 
developer default (α=0), k vanishes and the critical level of risk aversion and optimal prelease 
rent revert to those in the base case. Furthermore, k increases as the developer-default probability 
increases or the financial loss conditional upon default increases. Therefore we can regard the 
parameter k (k≥1) as the developer default impact parameter. 
Equation (20) implied that a higher default impact k will lead to a reduced prelease 
demand, D0. 
     0 00;  0D Dp 
 
           (22) 
  
This outcome is caused by the lessee’s being reluctant to prelease in the light of developer 
default risk. Equation (21) implies that a higher default impact k will lead to a decreased 
equilibrium prelease rent L0. The lessee’s hedging premium is reduced when she faces a 
developer default risk. 
     0 00;  0L Lp 
 
           (23) 
Figure 4-A illustrates the impact of the developer default probability upon the equilibrium rent-
risk relationship, while Figure 4-B demonstrates the impact of the lessee loss, conditional upon 
developer default, on the equilibrium rent-risk relationship. Figure 4 illustrates the results from 
Equation (23); the higher the likelihood of developer default or the greater the lessee loss, 
conditional upon default, the lower will be the equilibrium prelease rent. 
[Insert figure 4 around here] 
 
6. Effects of a Lessee’s Prelease Cancellation Clause 
A prelease contract with a tenant cancellation clause creates added flexibility for the 
lessee by creating an option for non-occupancy, and simultaneously protects the lessee from 
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market rent increases in the new building. Mooradian and Yang (2000) analyze the importance 
of the tenant cancellation strategy in the corporate real estate leasing decision. By including a 
lessee cancellation clause in the prelease contract, the lessor is essentially issuing a put option. 
If the prelease contract requires a cash deposit 
0( )L to obtain the right (but not the 
obligation) to rent the commercial real estate space in the future, the prelease lessee can “walk 
away” by forfeiting the deposit (the option premium) for any reason, including if the future 
market rent L1 decreases sufficiently.
13
 When the lessee decides to exercise the cancellation 
clause in the prelease contract, the maximum liability is equal to the amount of the deposit.
14
 
The optimal exercise of the cancellation clause occurs when  1 01L L  ; In that 
instance, the lessee will exercise the cancellation option and the lessor loses the prelease rent 
commitment. When  1 0L 1 L  , the cancellation option will not be exercised and the lessees 
will honor the prelease contract (ceteris paribus). The tenant’s utility with the prelease 
cancellation option is equal to or greater than that of the base case. 
              
  1 001 1min  ,  L LLi FU e e     
         
(24)
 
The critical value of risk aversion becomes  
 
 
 
 
 0
*
0* *
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*
0
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


 

  

 
 
   
 

          (25) 
 
Clearly, offering a prelease cancellation option increases prelease demand and decreases the 
critical value for risk aversion vis-à-vis that of the base case. 
The equilibrium prelease rent should implicitly price the lessee cancellation option. The 
developer maximizes the following expected utility from the combined prelease and spot lease 
markets: 
                                                 
13
 There are certainly other reasons that a tenant does not honor the prelease contract such as tenant default or size-
down, or alternative location choice, etc. On the other hand, there may some hidden costs of cancellation for the 
lessees. Therefore the proportional loss α should be interpreted as effective economic threshold for exercise the 
cancellation clause.  
14
 We abstract from additional lessee search costs and lessor space marketing expenses. 
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where IA(L1) is an indicator function  
 
 
1 1 0
1
1 1 0
1 if L  or L 1
0 if L  or L 1  
A
A L
I L
A L


  

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

 .
 
 
Equation (26) shows that when the spot market rent at T = 1 is significantly lower than the 
prelease rent, lessees who have signed a prelease contract will forfeit the deposit by walking 
away from the commitment and rent space on the spot market instead. The equilibrium prelease 
rent is solved by the developer’s maximization equation (27): 
     
     
*
0 0
0
2 2
0 1 2
*
0
2
*1
21
*
0
exp exp ( )
2
arg max
exp ( ) 1 exp
where , and d are functions of                                   
gL L
Cap Cap
L
g
Cap Cap
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e gr M N d g r M N d g
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L
g r M
L
 
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




   
                
 
       
                                                           (27)
 
The cancellation option scenario does not have a closed-form solution. We therefore 
employ numerical methods to deduce implications. Following the same frameworks as in figure 
3, the three panels in Figure 5 display the prelease function for various commercial real estate 
leasing market variables. It is not surprising that the equilibrium values for the prelease rent with 
the tenant cancellation option are higher than are those of the base case, because the lessor has to 
be compensated for the increased risk of adverse rent movements.  
Figure 5-A compares three prelease rent curves with different pairs of values for risk 
aversion for lessor and lessee. In contrast to Figure 3-A, the prelease rent increases with market 
volatility under these three scenarios of lessee-lessor risk-aversion relationships. Because the 
cancellation option is considered as part of the prelease rent in equilibrium, higher expected 
rental market risk will result in higher prelease rents. The prelease rent is higher when lessees are 
more risk-averse than the lessor is because the prelease rent includes an additional risk premium. 
Figure 5-B illustrates the prelease rent function for a range of capitalization rates. Figure 5-C 
shows the prelease rent function for varying levels of financing benefits. If the developer-lessor 
attains a greater financing benefit by preleasing, she is willing to secure lower prelease rents. 
However, the prelease rents are still higher than the expected spot market rent. If the financing 
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benefit is sufficiently higher (for example, there is a 10-percent financing benefit), the developer-
lessor could charge zero premium, because the value of financing benefit has well offset the cost 
of writing an option to the lessees. 
[Insert figure 5 around here] 
 
7. Conclusion 
Although commercial real estate preleasing is a common international practice, 
surprisingly few studies have investigated the economics of preleasing. This study has examined 
preleasing contracts for to-be-built commercial real estate, using a set of equilibrium micro-
economic agency models. The key analysis focuses on the lessee’s desire to hedge future rent 
increases while also creating an option for non-occupancy in the future, the lessor’s desire to 
hedge against future rent declines, and the generation of an option for default—non-delivery of 
the premises to tenants in a timely fashion. 
Our paper derives the conditions for generating a stable separating market equilibrium for 
prelease contracts and spot market leases, assuming heterogeneous risk preferences for lessees 
(and lessors). We are also able to determine the level of prelease activity as well as the prelease 
market-clearing rental rate. While our analysis has focused on to-be-built commercial real estate 
markets, the approach for our preleasing model, with minor modification, is applicable to other 
situations, including the preleasing of existing buildings as well as lease renewals.  
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Appendix  
Appendix 1. Derivation of basic model without lessor default or a lessee cancellation clause 
The tenant’s problem: 
 
The critical value of risk aversion can be derived by equating expected utilities from preleases 
and spot market leases.  
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The developer’s problem: 
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For risk-neutral developer, the prelease price is as follows: 
If lim g0 
2 2
*
0
0
2
lim log 1    
2 2
 
2
g
g Cap g
L Cap r M
Cap g Cap
Cap r M
 






  
        
  
    
 
 
*
0
2 2
*
0
2
2 2
*2
2 2 2
2 2
0
2 2 2 2 2 ( )
L g Cap
Cap g Cap
L
if
Cap Cap Cap gCap Cap Cap g
g g g g
  

  


  
 



 
   
 
 
 
 24 
 
The optimal prelease price *
0L is a concave function of rental risk
2 . The maximum optimal 
prelease price is achieved when the volatility of the real estate leasing price satisfies the 
following equation: 
 
*2
2
2 ( )Cap Cap g
g



  
The corresponding prelease price is given by the equation below: 
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Appendix 2. Derivation of Extension 1 to the Basic Model Considering Developer-Lessor 
Default 
 
We now introduce an exogenous counterparty risk of the prelease contracts. Let the default 
probability of the monopoly developer be p, the loss rate of default be . 
 
The tenant’s problem: 
If for exogenous reasons, the developer fails to complete the project. The tenant cannot get the 
delivery of prelease real estate unit. He has to rent on the spot market at T = 1 and lose a portion 
of the leasing price of the prelease contract (e.g. deposit) paid in T = 0. 
 
The tenant’s utility for prelease is:  
   0 0 11 ]1 [ ]
p L p L L
FMin EU E e
  

  
   
The critical value of risk aversion is found by equating the utilities from prelease and spot lease.  
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Therefore the risk aversion of the marginal tenant who is indifferent between participating on the 
prelease market and the spot market is given by the following equation:  
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In this model, the critical risk-aversion value shifts up. Therefore, there are less tenant enters into 
prelease market.  
 
2 2 2
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1 . Since  0 ,  0 1,  1,  > . 
1
p k
p k
L p L
  

  
  
       
   
 
In the presence of exogenous default risk, fewer tenants will enter into presale transaction. 
Furthermore, tenants are more sensitive to presale premium.  
 
The Developer’s Problem: 
 
In the case of developer default, the developer receives no revenue from presale market 
consumers. The expected utility of profit is of the following form: 
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Therefore the optimal prelease premium 
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The optimal hedging premium in the presence of developer default case is smaller than the one in 
our benchmark model.  
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Appendix 3. Derivation of Extension 2 to the Basic Model Considering Lessee’s 
Cancellation 
 
We endogenizes the tenant default in the prelease real estate contract. We assume that all tenants 
only put down a small amount of cash to obtain the right (but not the obligation) to rent the 
housing unit in the future. A prelease buyer can walk away by forfeiting the deposit (option 
premium) if the leasing price decreases significantly.  
 
The tenant’s problem 
 
Suppose now the tenant can pay  portion of the prelease price to purchase the right but not the 
obligation of renting one unit of real estate in the future at a pre-specified price. When the tenant 
decides to forfeit the presale contract, the maximum loss is equal to the down payment.  
 
The expected cost of renting a prelease real estate is of the following form: 
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Equating the expected utilities from the presale market and the spot market, the critical risk 
aversion can be derived as follows: 
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The Developer’s Problem: 
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 Figure 3-A: Commercial real estate leasing market risks and equilibrium rent of prelease contract by different risk-
aversion levels of lessees and lessor. Other parameters: average rent=10, cap rate=10%, no-default.  
 
Figure 3-B: Commercial real estate leasing market risks and equilibrium rent of prelease contract by different cap 
rates. Other parameters: average rent=10, equivalent risk-aversion level between average lessee and lessor, no-
default.  
 
Figure 3-C: Commercial real estate leasing market risks and equilibrium rent of prelease contract by different 
developer financing benefits. Other parameters: average rent=10, equivalent risk-aversion level between average 
lessee and lessor, cap rate=10%, no-default. 
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 Figure 4-A: Commercial real estate leasing market risks and equilibrium rent of prelease contract by different 
developer default probability. Other parameters: average rent=10, cap rate=10%, equivalent risk-aversion level 
between average lessee and lessor, loss given default = 0.5.  
 
 
 
Figure 4-B: Commercial real estate leasing market risks and equilibrium rent of prelease contract by different loss 
rates given default. Other parameters: average rent=10, cap rate=10%, equivalent risk-aversion level between 
average lessee and lessor, developer default probability = 0.5.  
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 Figure 5-A: Commercial real estate leasing market risks and equilibrium rent of prelease contract by different risk-
aversion levels of lessees and lessor. Other parameters: average rent=10, cap rate=10%, considering the Lessee’s 
Cancellation Clause.   
 
Figure 5-B: Commercial real estate leasing market risks and equilibrium rent of prelease contract by different cap 
rates. Other parameters: average rent=10, equivalent risk-aversion level between average lessee and lessor, 
considering the Lessee’s Cancellation Clause.   
 
Figure 5-C: Commercial real estate leasing market risks and equilibrium rent of prelease contract by different 
developer financing benefits. Other parameters: average rent=10, equivalent risk-aversion level between average 
lessee and lessor, cap rate=10%, considering the Lessee’s Cancellation Clause.   
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